Associational Democracy:
Community and Civil Society

8.1 Civil Society
8.2 Associational Democracy
8.3 Social Capital
8.4 Australian Associationalists and their Critics

For the past three weeks you have been examining how citizenship in our liberal democracy can be connected to the possession of various types of formal rights and responsibilities–legal, political and socio-economic. The question we will examine this week is whether anything more than these rights (along with the institutions and practices needed to realise them) is required to achieve and preserve an effective liberal democracy.

Some commentators have answered this question with an emphatic 'Yes'. They argue that the 'something more' that is required is a democratic political culture. Pointing to the difficulties experienced by the ex-communist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as they try to democratise their political systems, they note that what is specifically lacking in these countries is a truly democratic political culture. If liberal democracy is to succeed, they argue, then such a political culture must somehow be constructed. The question is, how? One influential answer states that an effective political democracy depends on the prior establishment of a healthy 'associational democracy'.

Your learning objective this week is to gain an understanding of the meaning of this term, 'associational democracy', and of the arguments advanced on its behalf. In doing this, you will also encounter the related ideas of 'civil society' and 'social capital', and read the work of some who try to apply them in the Australian context. We will start with notion of civil society, but first let us state the central claim of associational democracy. This is that: healthy democratic practice is impossible unless citizens develop and participate in a multitude of voluntary, non-state organisations and associations.

1.Civil Society

It is precisely this sort of voluntary association that was not permitted under communist rule. The typical communist state was, at least in intention, 'totalitarian'. In other words, it aspired to the total control of society. The contact between state and citizen was, in such a political system, immediate and direct. The 'big brother' state permeated all aspects of life. It discouraged the formation of associations independent of itself (or of the Communist Party which controlled the state, on the citizens' behalf). Loyalty and obedience to the party were paramount. Citizens thus acquired little experience of independently organising themselves for any purpose whatsoever, and consequently lacked the basic skills, values and attitudes of associational democracy. Citizens had little opportunity to learn the rights and responsibilities of cooperative enterprise, nor any tradition of involvement in self-governance even at a local level. State and party dominated all.

In most western countries, by contrast, a complex network of voluntary associations developed alongside commercial enterprise and liberal democratic government. Associations, such as mutual aid societies, professional guilds, religious fraternities and even choral societies, created a stratum of society able to act both as a protective buffer and as an indirect mode of connection between state and citizen. Although the powers of such voluntary organisations were influenced by the state and its legal system, they remained essentially independent of it. In some cases they tried in their turn to influence the state itself. Further even than that, there exist today a number of voluntary organisations that go beyond state borders to try to influence all the states of international society, on behalf, for example, of environmental causes, humanitarian assistance, or the protection of human rights. As you will see in Study Week 13, membership of these politically active non-governmental organisations (e.g. Greenpeace, World Vision, Amnesty International) implies a form of 'global citizenship'. The social stratum formed by the complex network of voluntary associations is often referred to the term 'civil society' which, in the global context, becomes 'global civil society'.

The words 'civil society' name the space of uncoerced human association and also the set of relational networks–formed for the sake of family, faith, interest, and ideology–that fill this space.

Michael Walzer (1995: 1)

 

Civil society is only possible if the idea of a private sphere separate from the public is regarded as legitimate, which the communist states denied. We must note, too, that totalitarian regimes of the fascist right were no more sympathetic toward civil society than those of the extreme left. Neither valued independence of thought, action or expression, and in fact often suppressed them. Each regime assumed that an active civil society could be nothing more than a breeding ground for dissent that would threaten the stability of the all-powerful state. It might be thought, then, that the historical triumph of liberal democracy over its fascist and communist rivals has demonstrated not only its superiority to both, but also the health of civil society in Western nations. Ironically, the collapse of communism in the East coincided with a new questioning of the state of health of democracy in the West. Some writers have argued further that it is precisely in the civil sphere that problems are most apparent.

Certainly, Western liberals have always stressed individual social and economic liberty rather than voluntary association as the fundamental value. These liberals have tended to dismiss those who have argued for more communitarian values as sentimental dreamers. At the same time, the growth of both big business and government has led to an increasing centralisation of economic and political power. Although liberal governments have never aspired to totalitarian goals, the centralisation of governmental power has left few self-governing responsibilities to the average individual, whether alone or in voluntary association with others. Even as the welfare responsibilities of the state have increased, they have tended to emphasise individual dependency on the central agencies rather than the kind of voluntary self-help solutions associated with civil society.

Under these circumstances, representative democratic government has become marked by a growing distance between citizen and government, and a consequent feeling of individual powerlessness and alienation. To this tendency has been added a deep sense of unease and insecurity as centralised governments in a globalising economy meet limits in their ability to provide the levels of employment or welfare assistance they once promised. This is the problem that the associational democrats attempt to address by re-examining the half-forgotten ideas of 'associationalism'.

2.Associational Democracy

The concentration of economic power in large corporations and the concentration of social welfare and social control in large bureaucracies acts against that dispersal of social power and influence that liberal democratic theorists have seen as essential to the preservation of liberty. The sphere of civil society and secondary associations shrinks in the face of bodies that are in effect compulsory (one has to seek work, and large bureaucracies amount to a significant share of the labour force; the unemployed are subject to welfare tutelage) and which are not open to the social and political influence of the average citizen.

Paul Hirst (1993: 112)

 

The above quotation is from the author of your next reading, Paul Hirst, who explains the idea of associational democracy and the principle of associationalism that it embodies. Hirst is writing in the British context, but his message is meant to apply generally. Note also that Hirst uses a number of terms with which you may be unfamiliar.

(1)Hirst defines associationalism loosely, and names two principles to which it is opposed. Associationalism is defined as a normative theory that asserts that both human welfare and liberty are best served where as many activities of society as possible are managed by voluntary, self-governing associations of citizens. This principle of social organisation is opposed to both pure free-market individualism and state collectivism.

 

(2)Hirst argues that the states that have fared best since the end of the post-war boom in 1973 show the possibility that associationalism can succeed. He writes that the states which have done best since the end of the post-war boom are those that have managed to balance cooperation and competition. The reason he gives is that states had sources of 'social solidarity' to draw on that mitigated the negative effects of individualism and the market on manufacturing industry. He uses the examples of Japan and West Germany (as it used to be). Both of these had cooperative and strongly coordinated government-industry institutions oriented toward business development. Note that Hirst considers these corporatist institutions merely simulated rather than displayed the sort of cooperative, coordinated economy that associationalists advocate. Nevertheless, he takes them as indicating that associationalist institutions can prove highly competitive. Whether he is justified in this is perhaps debatable. At any rate, he notes that Japan and West Germany are difficult models to copy for other nations, and may anyway be on the verge of crisis. This observation has been amply confirmed by the financial crises that have occurred in Asia since the article was written.

 

(3)Hirst argues that certain political and economic conditions have changed in Western states and that this makes a revival of associationalism appropriate at the present time. According to Hirst, the associationalists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries failed, not because their ideas were inherently impractical, but because under the political conditions of the time they could not compete with collectivist and centralist tendencies. The pressure toward centralisation was intense as states prepared for major wars. Labour movements were also impelled toward statism (state direction of the economy). But conditions have changed in the latter part of the century. The collapse of the communist countries means that Western states no longer face the external threat of major military competitors, while the internal threat of class war seems to have ended. There also appears to be less scope for the centralised management of the economy that these states have continuously employed since the Second World War to sustain economic development. Implicit here is the limits that globalisation places on state economic management. Manufacturing, meanwhile, is no longer characterised by the huge centralised organisations of 'Fordist' mass production. In other words, firms are smaller, less hierarchical, more flexible and this means they require less concentration of administration.

 

The main threats to liberal democratic society are no longer external and well-organised, but internal and diffuse. They include the threats of crime, poverty, drug addiction, none of which centralised bureaucracies handle very well. Hirst thinks that these problems are mainly the result of the failure of full employment strategies and also of collectivised welfare systems. A society is being created of permanent 'haves' and 'have nots', with unpleasant results for general living conditions. Under such conditions, associationalism offers great potential. Hirst argues that committed 'haves' must build well funded and effective voluntary associations in partnership with the poor and excluded. The poor will thus be helped to organise themselves, which is the only way, according to Hirst, that the slums will be transformed and social decline halted.

 

(4)Given certain conditions, Hirst argues, voluntary relationships will be superior to bureaucracies. He claims that, where they are properly funded and supported by the right kinds of laws and institutions, voluntary organisations are very tenacious and effective. Bureaucracies, on the other hand, are 'fragile and rigid', easily losing impetus and spirit when crises occur. To demonstrate his point, Hirst uses the examples of the British trade union movement and the British health and welfare systems, with their bureaucratised, top-down organisational style. Such management, he says, is the enemy of true welfare, health and education. The political lesson he draws is that it does not matter whether power is in the hands of the extreme left or the radical right. If state institutions have concentrated power the result is the same.

 

(5)Associationalism demands a change of thinking about voluntary associations in modern democratic theory. Voluntary associations are usually regarded as the 'cement' of civil society that holds the liberal democratic state together. A liberal democratic state is, in other words, a pluralist state (that is, power is distributed across many different interest groups), and voluntary associations are both the result and the condition of this pluralism. They are, on this view, secondary associations, subordinate to the dominant power of the state and perhaps of the corporate business world. Hirst, however, wants to reverse this priority and make voluntary self-governing associations the primary means of organising social life.

This is the large, central idea of associationalism. The goal is to reduce the state to a secondary role supportive of voluntary associations. Under associationalism, the state's powers and responsibilities will be greatly diminished. Their main functions would be those of ensuring peace between associations, protecting individual rights and providing the public finance to fund voluntary associations. In other words, the state will have mainly a regulatory role rather than an active governing one. For Hirst, this reform would enhance the importance of the judiciary and the legislature and diminish the role of the executive branch of government. Public provision of services rather than a free market model is expected by Hirst to be the norm. Yet, such services would not be administered by the state, but administered instead by voluntary, self-governing associations. The result, says Hirst, will be a viable representative democracy, with the state acting as a guardian of democratic processes rather than as the main service provider.

Hirst's view of associational democracy is quite radical, in that it envisions a substantial measure of local, self-regulation and self-governance for a whole variety of social groups. The advantage of this, he argues, would be that it would permit a reduction in the extent and complexity of laws of the central power, both in the social and economic spheres. But many social groups are quite antagonistic to one another's values (for example, pro-abortionists versus anti-abortionists, gays versus Christian fundamentalists). Might this not mean that the associationalist cure will be worse than the disease if it 'just endorses this negative pluralism and permits groups to opt out of a common political culture?' (Hirst 1993: 119). Hirst thinks not, and that in fact the best way to reduce group antagonism is to accept substantial self-regulation at the price of mutual tolerance. 'The essential checks imposed on such self-regulatory associations,' he (Hirst 1993: 120) argues, 'are that they must submit to certain minimum common standards of democratic self-governance and that they must not prevent exit by dissatisfied members'.

The benefits of associationalism will, according to Hirst, far outweigh any drawbacks. Most importantly, greater democratic self-governance will mean greater control by citizens over their own affairs. Associationalism is founded on the firm belief 'that voluntary self-governing associations are the best way of organizing human affairs that combines liberty with social obligation' (Hirst 1993: 121). Hirst advocates turning even companies and state welfare services into self-governing associations. What he is recommending is, in other words, a substantial decentralisation of power, a theme that has aroused interest among people of very different political persuasions. Hirst (1993: 122) writes:

Interest in decentralisation, regionalism and 'subsidiarity' is strong and growing right across the political spectrum: thus many conservatives want to roll back the state in the interests of greater accountability and not for mere financial advantage; Greens evidently want a less hierarchical and centralized economic system; and the left are desperately seeking some alternative to central planning.

Associationalism, says Hirst, is the only coherent theory that can give effective practical expression to these divergent aspirations and link them all together.

3.Social Capital

Self-governance through voluntary association can be expected to engender trust among people and to build the numerous skills required for effective cooperative action. It can create, in other words, what has been called 'social capital'. This is a term not used by Hirst, though implied in his description of associationalism. It is the term used, however, by others who have made a practical study of the effects of strong civic associations on democratic government and economic performance. The study described in your next reading has been very influential in this area. The key themes are: a culture of civic engagement, horizontal collaboration versus vertical dependency, impersonal credit, social capital, and trust.

STUDY EXERCISE 8.1

Read: R.D. Putnam, 1994. What makes democracy work?' IPA Review 47(1): 31—4.

Answer the following questions:

1. The creation in Italy in 1970 of a new set of regional governments provided political scientists with a unique opportunity. What was it?   Answer

2. What did Putnam discover was the best predictor of governmental success in the regions studied?   Answer

3. To what was the strength or weakness of a region's civil society traceable, according to Putnam?   Answer

4. What does Putnam mean when he says strong civil associations represent 'social capital'?   Answer

5.If social capital is lacking, how can more be created?   Answer

 

In a different article, Putnam (1995) has examined the decline of social capital that he claims has occurred in the United States. He points to the rise in crime, drug-taking and teenage births as evidence, and also to declines in levels of voter turn-out, attendance at Parent—Teacher Association and membership of clubs generally. When people prefer to stay home watching television rather than joining others in shared activities, the individual 'I' fails to develop into a communal 'we'. Trust declines in favour of selfish individualism, and so the prospects of violence increase.

We might echo Hirst here and note that such sentiments find a response right across the political spectrum, from right to left. Conservatives, for example, often point to the anti-social tendencies of modern society. They lament the loss of old values like honesty, decency, civility and a sense of public responsibility, not just among wayward youth but also in the wider business and political world. Socialists, for their part, view the increasingly individualising trend of modern life as damaging to the possibility of social cooperation, making it difficult or impossible to resist the economic forces of globalising capitalism. They, too, in their own way would like to recover a community ideal which emphasises social action not initiated by elites, but rather by egalitarian communities on their own behalf. They admit that the former communist countries, by failing to maintain civil society, became overly 'statist' (that is, dominated by the state to such an extent that they became forces for conservatism). As one English socialist, Peter Hain (1983: 54), argues:

The alternative is for socialists to reject statism and embrace a new approach, involving decentralisation of power and resources through state policies designed to mesh with a wider grass roots strategy for socialist mobilization.

On the other hand, Putnam and writers like him can be considered liberal critics of modern liberalism. They argue that economic liberals today tend to rely excessively on the market while neglecting the fact that successful markets are founded on social trust and mutuality. The political and economic strategies they promote, moreover, often have the effect of undermining the associational basis of trust. In other words, by depleting the social capital in society, ultimately such strategies will prove self-defeating.

4.Australian Associationalists and their Critics

The work of Putnam has been taken up with particular enthusiasm by Eva Cox who has strongly argued for the importance of social capital and associational democracy in the Australian context. In your next reading, she explains why Putnam's ideas interested her so much, but also why she thinks he does not go far enough.

STUDY EXERCISE 8.2

Read: E. Cox, 1995. Raising social capital. In A Truly Civil Society: 1995 Boyer Lectures. Sydney: ABC Books, pp. 21—5.

Answer the following questions:

  1. Why does Cox think Putnam's viewpoint is too narrow?  Answer

  2. How does she wish to extend the social capital concept?  Answer

  3. How does Cox apply the social capital idea to workplace culture, and what does she say about imposing competition in the workplace?  Answer

  4. Cox says building social capital is mainly a matter of interactions. What are the five factors she lists as involved in this?  Answer

  5. Why does Cox think the loss of social capital, both in general and in Australia in particular, should be identified as a serious problem? Why does she think increased government spending on crime in Australia is unlikely to be effective?  Answer

 

Note that Cox concludes by raising the question whether we are running down our social capital in Australia. In a further article she addresses a concern that others have expressed about associationalism. The fact, noted above, that it has been taken up by people with such diverse political values should perhaps make us cautious. An idea that can mean all things to all people may not have a clearly agreed definition.

Read:E. Cox, Social capital is banking on community. Australian 3 April, 1998: 13.

 

Cox's explanation about why 'society' is so firmly back on the agenda with so many differing groups rests partly on the observation that economics does not exist in a vacuum, but is founded on the social relationships existing between people. Another reason is that people are worried about increasing problems of social cohesion in a globalising world. Cox argues that the strategies that nations used to employ to transcend ethnic and communal divisions, and thus to achieve social cohesion, are no longer available, giving rise to a problem about what, today, 'makes us social'. People have somehow to build social trust, not just within particular, familiar communities, but between communities of 'strangers'.

This article, however, goes well beyond the argument that social capital is the starting point and foundation of trust building. Cox argues that the real problem is to find the proper mix of market, community and government solutions. In her earlier writings, Cox has been a stern defender of government's role in providing education, healthcare and welfare, funded if necessary by increased levels of taxation. Her opponents are economic liberals or 'free marketeers' who argue that more of these should be self-provided by individuals. Some of these writers allege that Australians are suffering from 'entitlement disease'. That is, they tend to believe themselves endlessly entitled to government 'hand-outs' rather than making their own way. Cox places her argument in the community-minded tradition of Australian egalitarianism in which government has always played a more significant role than elsewhere. She writes (Cox 1996):

Australia has a culture of civil society that has seen government, rather than private benevolence, as the way we meet needs. From our early days we saw government as being for us, and by us. Even when the state fails us, we want to improve it, not abandon it. We have a strong tradition of citizenship, not customer relationships. This is not an entitlement disease but part of the way we see our institutions and maybe compulsory voting makes us feel more responsible for our political system, flawed as it is.

Cox might claim support in this for from Paul Hirst, who argues more generally that no associationalist anywhere can afford to neglect the necessary role of the state. Hirst (1993: 130) writes:

However anti-statist modern associationalism might be, it cannot ignore the reality of the modern state, and it knows that private initiatives must go hand in hand with–indeed, may depend on-public reforms. Legal and institutional changes would be necessary to facilitate the rapid growth of associational governance.

The next reading discusses the question of Australian social capital from a historical perspective. Mark Latham, the Labor MP for Werriwa in New South Wales, deploys the idea of social capital as part of a larger argument for re-invigorating the policies of the Australian Labor Party. Latham (1998: 267) identifies two types of social capital:

A society ... in which trust is widely exercised as an expression of freely formed mutuality, carries the characterization of horizontal social capital. Herein lies an important distinction among the diverse features of social trust. Each of us tends to trust those in positions of authority–such as judges, teachers, police and doctors–for very different reasons and in very different ways to the sort of trust we might feel for friends, workmates and neighbours. Trust exercised through systems of hierarchy and authority is an expression of vertical social capital. This type of trust works through the threat of coercion, rather than the type of enlightened mutuality and reciprocation that characterises horizontal bonds of social capital

The vertical type of social capital is also distinguished by its potential to be exclusively owned, for example, by a patron. In modern government, the state usually 'owns and controls the source of coercion' (Latham 1998: 268). Horizontal social capital, however, by its very nature, cannot be 'owned' by any of the participants and is more likely to arise or decline without anyone deciding to do so. Latham claims that all societies reflect a mix of horizontal and vertical social capital. In the following reading he writes about these two kinds of social capital in Australia.

Read:M. Latham, 1998. Australian social capital. In Civilising Global Capital: New thinking for Australian Labor. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, pp. 283—90.

 

The next article you will read offers an economic liberal's response to the general associationalist line of reasoning. It argues that, contrary to what Cox, Putnam and others argue, a healthy market economy is the condition for a healthy civic culture rather than vice versa. In this article Shann refers to George Soros as a 'currency speculator'. Soros is the manager of the most successful international investment fund in the world. He is credited with (or blamed for) causing the Asian currency crisis of 1997 by withdrawing billions of dollars worth of financial investment from the region.

STUDY EXERCISE 8.3

Read:E. Shann, 1997. How a free market creates the civic urge. Australian 10 March: 11.

Answer the following questions:

  1. What is it the 'straw man' [something too easily knocked down] that Shann accuses George Soros of setting up?  Answer

  2. Rather than stressing voluntary associations as the foundation of democratic tolerance, Shann stresses an 'open society'. What does he mean by this, and how do you think it might be equated with the idea of civil society?  Answer

  3. What is needed, in Shann's view, for the open society to work, and why should this require the break-up of State monopolies?  Answer

  4. Why does Shann attack Eva Cox's view of state intervention?  Answer

 

Another criticism from an economic liberal perspective may be found in Andrew Norton's short review of Eva Cox's Boyer lectures.

Read:A. Norton, 1996. The errors of Eva Cox. Quadrant XL(3): 78—80.

 

Norton (1996: 80) also rejects the view that market competition leads to a loss of social capital and suggests that the real culprits may be the weaker socialisation of children (due to both parents working outside the home) and the negative impact of television on social values and perceptions.

It is not only liberals, however, who remain sceptical about the claims of the advocates of associational democracy. The socialist writer Ellen Wood (1990: 74), while admitting that it is vital for democratic systems to maintain civil liberties like freedom of speech and association, nevertheless argues that those who emphasise the importance of civil society tend to go too far. They draw, she says, too strong a contrast between the state as the realm of coercion and civil society as the realm of freedom. The latter is seen as the place where human emancipation and expansion proceeds in relative autonomy from the state. Wood (1990) points out that as a consequence: 'What tends to disappear from view, again, are the relations of exploitation and domination which irreducibly constitute civil society, not as some alien and correctible disorder but as its very essence'. Socialists like Wood argue that the associationalist democrats exaggerate the power and importance of small-scale civic associations. After all, some of the players in the 'civil sphere'–private corporations, for example–are very large and powerful, and in a position to dominate their smaller fellows.

Conclusion

From whatever political position one approaches the matter, it is safe to say that a number of questions remain to be answered about the significance of civil society and voluntary associations in a liberal democracy. Clearly, the proponents of associational democracy raise vital issues which deserve to be addressed. The consequences of a loss of a vibrant sense of community and of communal responsibility are often too plain and too grim to be ignored. In the worst cases, they include degradation of the physical and social environment, an increase in suspicion, violence and danger, a defensive withdrawal into individual or family life, and a pervading sense of futility and hopelessness.

These conditions are typical of those found in industrialising societies where displaced communities may have lost much of their traditional ways of life and exist in dependent poverty on the fringes (or sometimes in the hearts) of great cities. Although Putnam is correct to argue that, even in such unlikely situations, a sense of civic community can be fostered to the benefit of all, it is clear that associational democracy is unlikely to be the whole answer to such a huge problem of social change and development. Even in older industrialised societies, it is not obvious how much difference civil association on its own can make to systemic problems of marginalisation in a global economy. Undoubtedly, as Eva Cox and others state, civil society is only one element maintaining a liberal democracy. The role of voluntary associations in creating a democratic political culture must be placed in a larger picture that comprehends the contributing roles of both state and market.

Review for Week 8

Before proceeding, you ought to review your understanding of this week's topic by:

(a) checking your responses to the Study Exercises against those supplied in the Study Guide, and

(b) reading again the documents for this week and completing the related Study Questions in the Workbook, for which there are no answers provided.

 


Next week we shall begin a new part of the unit that examines a number of key controversies surrounding citizenship and democracy. The first of these controversies concerns the question of whether it is possible to balance the competing demands of military service for ones country and that of ones conscience.

 

References

Cox, E. 1995. A Truly Civil Society: 1995 Boyer Lectures. Sydney: ABC Books, pp. 21—5.

Cox, E. 1996. 'Society's standards worth higher taxes.' Australian 13 September: 13.

Cox, E. 'Social capital is banking on community.' Australian 3 April, 1998: 13.

Hain, P. 1983. The Democratic Alternative. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Hirst, P. 1993. 'Associational Democracy.' In D. Held ed. Prospects for Democracy: North, South, East, West. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 112—17.

Latham, M. 1998. Civilising Global Capital: New thinking for Australian Labor. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Norton, A. 1996. The errors of Eva Cox. Quadrant XL(3): 78—80.

Putnam, R.D. 1994. What makes Democracy Work? IPA Review 47(1): 31—4.

Putnam, R.D. 1995. Tuning in, tuning out: The strange disappearance of social capital in America. Ithiel de Sola Pool Lecture to the American Political Science Association.

Shann, E. 1997. How a free market creates the civic urge. Australian 10 March: 11.

Walzer, M. 1995. The concept of a civil society. In M. Walzer ed. Toward a Global Civil Society. Providence: Berghahn Books, pp. 7—27.

Wood, E.M. 1990. The uses and abuses of 'civil society'. In R. Milliband, L. Panitch and J. Saville eds Socialist Register. London: Merlin, pp..

 

Further Reading

Cohen, J. and Rogers, J. 1995. Associations and Democracy. London: Verso, pp. 33—46.

Farrar, A. and Inglis, J. eds 1996. Keeping it Together: State and Civil Society in Australia. Sydney: Pluto Press.

Hirst, P. 1994. Associative Democracy. Amherst MA: University of Massachusetts Press.

Krygier, M. 1996a. The sources of civil society: Part one. Quadrant XL(10): 12—22;

Krygier, M. 1996b. The sources of civil society: Part two. Quadrant XL(11): 26—33.

Putnam, R.D. et al. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, ch 6 on 'Social Capital'.

Norton, A. Latham, M. Sturgess, G. and Stewart-Weeks, M. 1997. Social Capital: The Individual, Civil Society and the State. Sydney: Centre for Independent Studies.

Internet and On-Line Resources

Below is a list of web-sites relevant to this week’s course material. These sites should be of use in completing the study and research exercises for this week.

Boyer Lectures, Eva Cox:

Civic Practices Network:

Social Capital:

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