Social Democracy:
Socio-Economic Rights and Duties
In the preceding weeks you have examined
civil and political rights and duties within the Australian system of government.
In this week's study your understanding of citizenship will be extended to include
socio-economic rights and duties. This will entail thinking about the concepts
of social democracy and social citizenship. The main objectives
are:
- to elaborate the concept of 'social
citizenship' and its relationship to civil and political citizenship;
- to examine the vulnerability of
social rights and the ways in which social citizenship might be narrow or
exclusionary; and
- to evaluate the extent and quality
of social democracy and social citizenship in Australia.
This Study Week will also draw on the
important work of T.H. Marshall that has been mentioned earlier in Study Weeks
1 and 3.
1.Social Citizenship:
A Third Element of Citizenship?
The limits of liberal democracy
have been the subject of political debate since the origin of parliamentary systems.
Debates over the ability of parliamentary democracy to reduce the inequalities
of capitalist society led to a distinct division among critical thinkers. One
the one hand there are those who argued that parliamentary systems would inevitably
reinforce the inequalities and class divisions of capitalist societies. On the
other hand are those who saw the possibility of reform through parliamentary means.
For the latter, a system of social democracy was possible. The impetus
to social democracy would come from the voting power of the more numerous working
class would instigate a process of reform through which the excesses of capitalism
could be controlled and a more just society created. Transformation from a liberal
to a social democracy from this perspective required overcoming the class inequalities
generated by capitalism. This was to be achieved through programs to erode economic
insecurity and enhance the power and political influence of the working class.
A less radical perspective was held by among those who did not adhere to a 'class'
perspective on society. They argued that there was a need to address matters of
social inequality through the parliamentary system and thus add a 'social' element
to liberal democracy.
Although there is a wide spectrum of
views on the nature of social democracy, it is in essence a political program
that requires as much emphasis to be placed on social and economic rights, as
on the civil and political rights. The general argument is that citizenship is
incomplete if based purely on civil and political rights. As you have seen in
earlier Study Weeks, this point of view was expressed cogently by T. H. Marshall
([1950] 1983) in his famous essay 'Citizenship and Social Class'. This essay provides
a starting point for debates over the concept of social citizenship
and the rights and duties that it entails. It is an essential point of reference
in the pursuit of our first objective: to elaborate the concept of 'social
citizenship' and its relationship to civil and political citizenship.
Marshall's view was that the concept
of citizenship comprised three distinct elements that had evolved gradually over
the two and one half centuries prior to his analysis. It is worth reviewing its
three elements, the first two of which of which were treated in the previous two
weeks. The three components of citizenship are:
- civil citizenship, involving
rights to property, personal liberty and justice;
- political citizenship, involving
the right to vote and stand for parliamentary office; and
- social citizenship, through
the provision of economic security and thus the right to '…live the
life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society'
(Marshall [1950] 1983: 249).
In part, Marshall's argument was
that the social element of citizenship could be added on through the provision
of welfare services to provide a more egalitarian society and thus a more comprehensive
form of citizenship. Marshall was also concerned that the class system associated
with civil society was inconsistent with full citizenship. He thought that civil
citizenship was in some ways inimical to social citizenship, '…so much
so that citizenship itself has become…the architect of legitimate social
inequality'. For example, the 'liberty' of the free market is an aspect of civil
citizenship which in effect creates inequality. While both capitalists and workers
have the same 'right' to act as independent and autonomous agents in the labour
market, the 'freedom' to sell one's labour in a labour market is in practice
limited. This is because economic necessity forces most individuals to take
employment where it is offered. Moreover, insistence on a 'free' labour market
will hinder the ability to protect wages and working conditions, or offer relief
to the poor. Capitalist liberal democracies can be seen as based on a 'possessive
individualism' (Macpherson 1962) that incorporates individual freedom and contractual
rights, but precludes the possibility of socio-economic equality.
Nevertheless, Marshall's view was essentially
optimistic. Writing at the beginning of the post World War II era of growth, and
at the time of a new Labour government in Britain, he had reason to anticipate
that the measures he considered supportive of social citizenship would be politically
feasible and enduring. The provision of social services, education and full employment
were high on political agendas in the post war period in many industrialised nations,
and Marshall's contention was that these types of programs would enhance social
citizenship to the extent that some erosion of class inequalities would occur.
For Marshall, what mattered was '…a general enrichment of the concrete substance
of civilized life, a general reduction of risk and insecurity, an equalization
between the more and the less fortunate at all levels' (Marshall 1950: 258). As
Barbalet's (1993: 38) interpretation of Marshall's argument suggests, this was
not necessarily a belief that class inequalities would be completely eliminated:
Social citizenship has not eliminated
class nor even in an unequivocal manner removed social inequality. Indeed the
development of citizenship, including social citizenship, has given rise to new
inequalities… . What Marshall wishes to argue, though, is that social citizenship
has tended to reduce certain social inequalities, and especially those associated
with the operations of the market, so that the market value of individuals is
no longer determinant of their real income because of the provision through state
administration of economic goods and services as a right.
Such a view implies some 'decommodification'
of labour which means a reduction of the extent to which individuals are reliant
on the market value of their labour to secure an adequate standard of living.
A more direct attack on class divisions
also requires strategies that directly affect the system of private ownership
underpinning capitalism. The concept of economic democracy, for example,
implies not simply the delivery of welfare and social benefits to economically
disadvantaged individuals, but removal of the division between owners of capital
and workers. Exercises in worker control and collective ownership of enterprises
are strategies through which this level of economic democracy might be pursued.
One example was the attempt to set up
of 'wage earner funds' in Sweden in the early 1980s. The idea of wage earner funds
was developed over many years in Sweden, and involved channelling a proportion
of the profits of large enterprises into funds solely or partially managed by
unions or worker representatives. Ultimately, such a scheme was designed to deliver
worker control of major enterprises and their investment decisions. The key difficulty
was that such a scheme met with concerted resistance from business. In spite of
a long history of Social Democratic government in Sweden, the policy implemented
in 1983 was a very watered-down version of the proposals that had been developed
by the union movement. This is one example that indicates a few of the difficulties
confronting strategies which have the potential to affect the class system. Radical
proposal to alter the ownership and control of enterprises are unlikely to gain
sufficient political support to achieve implementation in liberal democratic societies.
Within the broad spectrum of possibilities
of socio-economic rights there will always be debate over how much social welfare
or economic democracy is necessary to sustain a meaningful level of social citizenship.
Critics have also debated whether this goal requires the elimination of class
divisions entirely. What is clear, however, is that even the basic level of
state welfare provision implemented by many governments in the post World War
II era has not been successfully maintained in most advanced industrialised
countries in the latter part of the twentieth century. A 'crisis of the welfare
state' has shown social rights to be extremely vulnerable, and the drive towards
social citizenship has encountered a number of significant hurdles. We now turn
to an examination of some of these limits to the pursuit of social citizenship.
2.The Vulnerability
of Social Rights and the Limits to Social Citizenship
In this section our main goal is
to address our second objective - to examine the vulnerability of social rights
and the ways in which social citizenship might be narrow or exclusionary.
The discussion will also have relevance for our third objective (to evaluate
the extent and quality of social democracy and social citizenship in Australia),
which will be addressed more fully in the final section of these notes.
We begin by noting some of the main
criticisms made of Marshall's argument in order to identify some of the obstacles
in the pursuit of social citizenship. An important consideration here is to reiterate
that Marshall's optimism that the delivery of social rights would help reduce
levels of socio-economic inequality was in part a reflection of the time period
in which he was writing. The economic recessions of the 1970s and the subsequent
re-emergence of free market economics as a guiding philosophy for Western governments
have since led to the questioning of welfare programs in many countries, emphasising
the vulnerability of social rights to prevailing political philosophies and economic
conditions. A widespread 'crisis of the welfare state' has been identified as
governments have been faced with increasing welfare demands while also facing
pressures to reduce debt and increase industry efficiency and international competitiveness.
As Castles (1996: 12) argues, 'Almost universally the social democratic project
has come unstuck, with faltering economic growth, massively increased unemployment
and burgeoning social inequality'. In Australia, this trend has been evident in
a set of policies guided by the logic of 'economic rationalism', which is an approach
based on liberal economic ideas of free markets and minimal government intervention.
Under this approach, welfare benefits in Australia (and elsewhere) were shown
to be extremely vulnerable. Many areas have been increasingly 'targeted' at only
the most disadvantaged groups, rather than being maintained universally as broad
social rights.
Further problems perceived with Marshall's
analysis are his focus primarily on class inequality. This allows Marshall to
overlook inequalities based on divisions such as gender, race or ethnicity. Moreover,
Marshall's concentration on 'rights' rather than 'duties' obscured some aspects
of citizenship. These issues are central to our objective of identifying the vulnerability
of social rights and evaluating the tendency for social citizenship to be narrow
or exclusionary. In examining these questions we will focus on the Australian
situation and draw on the work of Jocelyn Pixley.
After noting the rather restricted scope
of the term 'citizenship' in Australian political rhetoric, Pixley turns to an
examination of the concept of citizenship. Her overview of Marshall's arguments
should extend your understanding of his work. Her analysis will also be useful
in highlighting some criticisms of Marshall and suggesting some reasons for the
vulnerability of social rights. Especially note her argument that '…the universal
status of citizen was far more politically vulnerable than Marshall imagined,
and…the social citizenship of the welfare state was never promoted as open
to political participation from below' (Pixley 1992: 219).
You will need to read carefully the
section 'The concept of citizenship' in which Pixley elaborates a distinction
between rights and obligations. For Pixley, both Marshall's analysis
and the revival of debates over citizenship in the 1980s emphasised rights at
the expense of obligations. Pixley's argument is that this orientation tends to
encourage a view of welfare benefits as based on paternalistic notions of compassion
or benevolence, rather than as citizenship rights. Such 'benefits' may then be
perceived as incompatible with civil rights—that is, as restricting freedom
and autonomy in society. Pixley (1992: 220) notes: 'The welfare discourse of "client",
"claimant", "targeting" and "benefit" used by state agencies does indeed presume
the opposite of freedom, and rests more on the old workhouse tradition'. An alternative
view, Pixley argues, would be to see social rights as providing the preconditions
for civil rights and political participation.
'Social rights' therefore present a
number of problems. They may be associated with dependency. That is, divisions
are likely to arise between those best able to become 'market citizens' through
employment, and those more likely to be relegated to the role of dependent welfare
clients, and thus a second class citizenship. Pixley's view is that rights need
to be conceptualised as attached to obligations. In this context, Pixley is careful
to distinguish between duties and obligations, arguing that it is the latter ('freely
assumed obligations') that are conducive to citizenship.
Pixley applies her conceptualisation
of rights and obligations to the analysis of social citizenship in Australia at
three historical periods: the turn of the century; the long boom (1940s—1970s);
and the crisis years (1970s on). Her focus is primarily on women and the unemployed
as groups whose citizenship tended to be narrow or marginal. Study the section
of Pixley's article entitled 'Australian workers and clients' and read the notes
below. As you progress you should be able to answer the following questions:
| STUDY EXERCISE 7.1
Read:J. Pixley, 1992.
Citizen, worker or client? State, class and welfare. In M. Muetzelfeldt
ed. State, Society and Politics in Australia. Leichhardt, NSW:
Pluto Press, pp. 216-41.
Answer the following questions:
1.What is the distinction between
duties and obligations that Pixley elaborates, and how does each of these
concepts relate to social citizenship? Answer
2.What groups (other than women
and the unemployed) might have tenuous status as citizens in Australia?
Answer
3.From the material Pixley presents,
what conclusions can be drawn about women's social citizenship status
at the turn of the century? How different is the situation in the 1990s?
Answer
4.What changes in expectations
of social rights and duties have accompanied persistently high levels
of unemployment in Australia in recent decades? Answer
|
Our focus here will be on the two groups
Pixley analyses in some depth—women and the unemployed. The discussion will
refer to Pixley's arguments as well as introducing further material on policies
that have ramifications for the citizenship status of these groups.
The attainment of social citizenship
has always been more problematic for women than men. Historically, the
scope of citizenship for women often has often been limited to their reproductive
roles as mothers, outside the market economy. The following document gives a distinctive
account of how the role of the 'citizen mother' was to be exercised early in the
20th century.
| Read:E.S.H. 1920.
First Australian baby week: To-day and to-morrow our nation must look
to the babies. In M. Lake and K. Holmes eds Freedom Bound II. Sydney:
Allen & Unwin, pp. 35—7. |
As Pixley (1992: 221) explains, 'Women
… were always treated as the "natural" social exiles, subject to private
patriarchy "behind closed doors"', while the concept of a freely autonomous 'market
citizen' was essentially masculine. The centrality of paid employment as an aspect
of social citizenship, and the tendency to attach welfare provisions (for example,
superannuation) to work contracts clearly have very different consequences for
men and women. At the most basic level, women are less likely to be labour market
participants than men, and when they do participate, are less likely to occupy
high status jobs. Women are more likely than men to be welfare dependents, although
Pixley (1992: 221), in citing Yeatman, does note that '…we are also witnessing
a new development of class differences, between those women who can buy their
way out of feminine dependency and claim masculine, freely-contracting status,
and those who cannot'.
Pixley's article focuses in particular
on the way social provisions and institutional structures in Australia have affected
women's citizenship status. Pixley argues that from the turn of the century, motherhood
and private dependency on husbands were reinforced in Australia in two main ways.
The first was through government laws and regulations which restricted access
to paid employment and the second was through welfare provisions which were conditional
on means tests.
The general presumption in Australia
was that women's roles as wives and mothers precluded their full-time engagement
in paid employment. At most, women were thought to work for trivial extras in
their lives ('pin money') rather than for a subsistence wage. It was also assumed
that women should not need to work in a place like Australia where male wages
were comparatively high. Moreover, paid employment was thought to carry moral
risks for women, as well as risks of exploitation by employers due to their comparative
lack of bargaining power. Macintyre (1985: 45—46) notes that humanitarian
and moral reformers of the time viewed their task as:
to preserve the sanctity of home and
family, and to rescue vulnerable family members from the pernicious effects of
the market. They were horrified by the promiscuous mixing of sexes in factories,
and the loosening of moral restraints that they attributed to the spread of employment.
Pixley also refers to the marriage bars—that
is, regulations requiring women to resign on marriage—which were implemented
in public sector employment. These restrictions were clearly based on of the vision
of women as attached primarily to home and family. At the federal level of government,
this bar was not removed until the mid-1960s.
In Pixley's view, Australia's centralised
wage fixing system also contributed to the relegation of women to second class
citizen status. The arbitration system was an essential element of the Australian
'experiment' in social democracy, delivering protection of wage levels and the
ability to compel employers to abide by an arbitrated decision. Its central feature,
however, the 'family wage', was based explicitly on concepts of the male as breadwinner.
Women were allocated a much lower wage unless they were employed in areas where
their cheaper rates might threaten male employment. (The arbitration system and
the associated concept of a 'wage earners' welfare state' are discussed more fully
in the following section.)
Nevertheless, for all these problems,
the arbitration system did provide an effective minimum wage and prevented some
of the most severe exploitation of low paid workers. This was of some consequence
for women, who tended to be concentrated in low paid areas of the labour market,
for example in textile and clothing factory work. It is also important to remember
that the idea of males as the primary breadwinners, and therefore entitled to
a higher wage than women, was evident in most nations at this time. Even where
there was no formal arbitration machinery to institutionalise such concepts, women
were paid considerably less than men.
Ideas about women's participation in
paid employment have changed since the early days of the Australian federation.
Pixley's article notes the influx of women into paid employment during World War
II, and their subsequent displacement once it was over. In this particular article,
however, Pixley does not highlight the range of policies that were introduced
as women's labour force participation increased dramatically in later decades.
These policies include (a) discarding the concept of a 'family wage' through the
equalisation of male and female basic wages in 1974, and (b) the adoption of equal
pay principles such as those put in place by the federal industrial tribunal in
1969 and 1972. A Sex Discrimination Act introduced in 1984 and an Affirmative
Action Act in 1986 also added to the formal mechanisms designed to offer some
protection for women by affirming their status as equal participants in the labour
force. Additional measures have included the development of child care provisions
(which, in Australia, has been at least partly accepted as a public responsibility)
and the introduction of (unpaid) maternity and parental leave as a basic entitlement.
While none of these measures has been
an unequivocal success, and the masculinity of 'market citizenship' has not been
eliminated, considerable advances have occurred in recognising the particular
difficulties faced by women in paid employment. Nevertheless, women (on average)
remain disadvantaged in comparison to men in the Australian labour market. The
following extract from the Office of the Status of Women's submission to the 1998
review of the Affirmative Action Act includes a brief synopsis of women's labour
market position and a statement of the perceived economic advantages of the application
of equal employment opportunity policies.
| Read:Office of the
Status of Women. 1998. Submission to the Regulatory Review of the Affirmative
Action Act 1986. Canberra: Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet,
pp. 1—3. |
Such policies have not attracted universal
approval even among women. In the following reading, Judith Sloan offers a criticism
of government legislation designed to bring about more equal opportunities for
women.
| Read:J. Sloan, 1997.
Opportunity knockback. Australian 25 July: 13. |
While significant legislative protections
have been introduced over recent decades, their potential benefits for women are
currently being counteracted by the tendency towards a more flexible and less
regulated labour market. Pixley's (1992: 234) article emphasises the increasingly
divided labour market, in which a '…core of principal citizens now includes
some women who, like chameleons, maintain their positions by imitating the male
models' while a large peripheral (highly feminised) workforce contains an increasing
number of insecure part-time and casual positions. When coupled with the reduction
of many welfare provisions and cut backs in some policy areas (such as child care)
under recent governments, these labour market trends offer little scope for the
extension of women's social citizenship in a meaningful or egalitarian way in
the near future.
Another key aspect of citizenship is
access to paid employment. Australia, in particular, has been labelled a 'wage
earners' welfare state'—implying that social rights have been delivered primarily
through the protection of high wages (for men) rather than through the social
security system. Such a system was sustainable so long as unemployment remained
low. In Pixley's view, however, '(f)ull employment was abandoned in 1975 when
the jobless rates for adults [as well as youths] started rising'. Increases in
unemployment led to dramatic increases in social dependency (see reference to
the work of Freeland in Pixley 1992: 230—1).
Pixley argues that the abandonment of
a full-employment objective led governments to reconceptualise social rights and
duties. This was partly achieved under the Fraser government by defining unemployment
as an individual problem and encouraging women to leave the labour market to return
to unpaid caring roles (1992: 235—6). Pixley (1992: 236—7) also notes
the Hawke government's ideas about seeking 'alternatives to paid work'—that
is, the encouragement of self-supporting communities. In her book Citizenship
and Employment: Investigating Post-Industrial Options (1993) Pixley makes
a strong case that such initiatives restrict rather than extend citizenship. Here
she emphasises the centrality of paid employment to citizenship rights in advanced
economies.
Under the current Coalition government
the issue of unemployment has been seen as secondary to other macro-economic concerns
such as reduction of public debt. Government ministers have argued that unemployment
will fall when the 'economic fundamentals' are corrected. The idea that the market
will solve the problem is reflected in their removal of several labour market
programs, and more recently, the privatisation of employment services. Another
Coalition initiative which has significant implications for social rights and
duties has been the introduction of the work-for-the-dole scheme. Elements of
compulsion in this proposal imply that employment cannot be conceptualised as
a 'freely assumed obligation' or as a citizenship right, and that individuals
must undertake specific duties if they 'fail' in their attempts to find work.
Some of the debates over the work-for-the-dole
scheme are illustrated in the following extract from the Australian Democrats
dissenting report on the proposal.
| Read:Australian Democrats.
1997. Work for the Dole: Dissenting Report. Canberra: Parliament
of Australia: 1—4. |
The issue of compulsion is central to
these debates, and is of great significance to any discussion of social rights
and social citizenship. You might like to consider how you would classify work-for-the-dole
requirements in terms of Pixley's contrast between 'freely assumed obligations'
and 'duties'.
3.Australia–Social
Democracy or Limited Welfare State?
In this section we develop further
our third objective: to evaluate the extent and quality of social democracy
and social citizenship in Australia. Australia at the turn of the century
was widely regarded as a 'social laboratory' in which citizenship rights such
as employment and high wages were guaranteed (at least for men). It was depicted
as a 'working man's paradise' where working conditions and the standard of living
was perceived to be considerably higher than in countries such as Great Britain.
These comparatively advantageous working conditions were fought for by unions
and came to be protected by the state through what Castles (1988) has termed a
'historic compromise'. The historic compromise involved initiatives in three interrelated
areas of policy:
- arbitration (protecting the
wages and conditions of labour and delivering a 'fair wage');
- industry protection
(protecting manufacturing against external competitors, thus enhancing their
ability to pay a fair wage);
- immigration (restricting
immigration to protect the jobs of Australian workers — a policy at
times explicitly racist).
These origins formed the basis for a
particular type of welfare state — a 'wage earners' welfare state' —
in which social rights were primarily attached to employment rather than universal
social welfare provisions. Clearly there are strengths and weakness to this model.
If we focus purely on the scope of welfare provisions, international comparisons
show Australia provides only very minimal social rights. In Esping-Andersen's
(1990: 26) view, for example, Australia is typical of a 'liberal' model of welfare
state. The characteristics of the liberal approach include means-tested assistance,
modest universal transfers, and entitlements governed by strict rules. All these
are often associated with stigma. Recognition of the contribution to social welfare
through broader economic and wages policies, however, permits a different view
(see Castles and Mitchell 1993). At least in its early history, Australia was
often seen as a nascent social democracy in which a strong working class had managed
to gain significant social benefits.
Certainly, the 'wage earners' welfare
state' produced a society in many ways more egalitarian than those in which wage
bargaining remained unregulated. At the heart of the model was the 'Harvester
judgement'. This was a decision by the federal industrial tribunal in 1907 to
base wages not on the capacity of industry to pay, but on social
need. The level of remuneration established in this case by Justice Higgins was
calculated on the amount of money required for a man to support a wife and three
children in 'frugal comfort'. It was, therefore, a 'family wage'. Higgins decided
that a fair and reasonable wage must be based on need. Neither the market value
of labour nor the financial condition of the industry could be acceptable criteria
since the task of the Court presupposed some higher standard than the higgling
of the market. If an enterprise could not pay its workers a living wage, then
it would be better abandoned (Macintyre 1985: 55).
Of course, the reality was that this
'needs based' decision reflected quite explicitly the market rate being paid to
workers at the time. Nevertheless, the establishment of a basic wage and its regulation
by industrial tribunals did provide some buffer against free market forces, and
male workers in many areas of the economy did benefit from this approach. Yet,
as we have already noted how this 'family wage' fitted with assumptions about
women's primary roles of wife and mother, and effectively relegated them to second
class citizenship in the labour market. It is also apparent that a wage earner's
welfare state depends on full employment if it is to deliver the social rights
constitutive of social citizenship.
At this stage you should read the article
by Frank Castles. This will assist you in developing your understanding of the
Australian model, as well as introducing debates about how it has fared throughout
the economic cut-backs and rising unemployment of recent decades. Castles begins
by explaining some of the difficulties of measuring welfare outcomes and the prevalence
of contradictory findings in analyses. His goal, however, is to illuminate the
'big picture' of what has been happening to the basic shape of the Australian
welfare state. His focus is on the decade 1983—93, during which it appeared
to many that the Australian welfare system was being eroded in the face of the
economic rationalism of the Labor government. In reading Castles' article, try
to consolidate and extend your understanding of the Australian model.
| STUDY EXERCISE 7.2
Read:F.G. Castles,
1994. The wage earners' welfare state revisited: Refurbishing the established
model of Australian social protection, 1983—93. Australian Journal
of Social Issues 29(2): 120—45.
Answer the following questions:
1.What policy areas does Castles
view as central to the development of the 'basic model' of Australian
social welfare? Answer
2.What reasons does Castles
suggest for the distinctive welfare model that developed in Australia
and New Zealand? Answer
3.What benefits other than comparatively
high wages were delivered to employees in the wage earners' welfare state?
Answer
4.What examples of the targeting
of welfare benefits does Castles note occurred during the 1983—93
period? Answer
|
Castles elaborate four 'axioms' of the
wage earners' welfare state.
- The first is the importance of
'occupational' (that is, employment based) welfare, which in Australia included
higher than market-rate wages and leave provisions such as sick leave and
long-service leave.
- The second is the ability through
comparatively high wages to invest in one's own home, and in the process provide
security for old age.
- The third is reliance on progressive
income taxation to fund welfare provisions. This, Castles argues, derives
from worker resistance to social insurance schemes or taxes on consumption
in a system where individuals are essentially paying for their own needs.
Apart from the problems noted by Castles, one consequence of this lack of
a social insurance scheme is that provisions such as parental leave become
a direct cost for employers. Australia's poor record on paid maternity leave
at least partly reflects this aspect of its social security system.
- The fourth axiom that Castles
identifies is that a wage earners' welfare state provides a lesser status
for women than for men. Women earned less than men as they were not considered
to be 'breadwinners'. Their presumed dependence on men was reflected in welfare
provisions such as the widow's pension, where the state performed the role
of the missing male.
The main argument that Castles presents
in his article is that although some significant challenges to the Australian
welfare model were presented with the onset of economic rationalism in policy
making, the model has a degree of resilience. Castles argues that Labor's policies
contributed in many ways to its maintenance (in contrast to events in New Zealand
at the time). Castles also argues that there was little advancement during the
1983—93 period, if one focuses solely on universal state welfare provision.
The only exception was the reintroduction of a national health scheme. For the
most part, welfare policies became increasingly 'targeted'. That is, entitlements
were restricted to certain kinds of 'selected' individuals and more carefully
policed.
Nonetheless, Castles points out that
targeting under Labor also involved some increases of benefits, such as increases
in the value of pensions. In the area of 'occupational welfare' he notes the introduction
of workplace superannuation funded primarily from employer contributions (although
these contributions have mainly been in lieu of wage increases). This initiative,
introduced through the arbitration system in the first place, seems to Castles
to be consistent with, and a flexible adaptation of, the wage earners' welfare
state. It might even be argued, however, that it is gender biased in the same
way as the early wage earners' welfare state, although Castles does not see it
this way. Castles (1994: 136) argues that workplace superannuation 'is potentially
the key to greater gender equality in access to welfare'. The weaker attachment
of women to the labour market and their, on average, lower earnings than men effectively
means that most women will accrue lower superannuation benefits than men. Also,
once workplace superannuation is the norm, the back-up system (the pension) is
likely to become less well funded and carry more in the way of social stigma.
While Castles does not develop this
particular argument about the risks for women, and is generally supportive of
Labor's efforts in adapting the wage earners' welfare state, he does note that
in other ways the model was undermined during the period he examined. For example,
the withdrawal of industry protection and wage regulation removed essential aspects
of the earlier Australian model, and it was also rendered less effective with
rising unemployment.
Although the article addresses only
the period to 1994, you should consider whether it would be possible in 1998 to
make similar arguments about the resilience of the wage earners' welfare state.
Note that the central institutional feature of the model—the arbitration
system—has been limited further by the Coalition's Workplace Relations
Act. The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) has made efforts to reinject
a 'living wage' element to wage negotiation in order to protect those groups unable
to gain wage increases in the new decentralised environment of wage bargaining.
Its success has been limited, however, with the tribunal only willing to pass
on minimal increases to such workers.
Overall, the defining features of the
wage earners' welfare state, such as the pursuit of a 'fair wage' and a degree
of wage equality across the labour market, have largely been lost. Moreover, although
the initial version of the wage earners' welfare state was gender biased, its
erosion does not promise a higher level of gender equality in employment. Women's
labour force participation remains high in the 1990s, but women are significantly
over-represented in low status part-time and casual work. Their average earnings
also remain well below men's. A more deregulated and decentralised labour market
is likely only to exacerbate these problems. At the same time, the Coalition's
favouring of single income families in its taxation and other policy proposals,
plus its cut-backs to childcare, threaten to tie more women to the roles of wife
and mother.
4.Critiques of
Socio-economic Rights
The theory and practice of socio-economic
rights has attracted much criticism from those who see the market as providing
the main solution to social and economic problems. In the next reading Bernard
Robertson offers a detailed critique of the concept of social and economic rights.
He argues that the original objective of a right was to protect individual autonomy
and that government was needed to provide the basic legal framework for this task.
Robertson points out how, in seeking to advance social rights, government can
threaten autonomy. Robertson gives a good sense of the kinds of arguments used
by those who oppose the extension of the idea of a right into the economic sphere.
For Robertson the only defensible kinds of economic right are those suggested
by the classical liberal tradition. These include the right to own property and
other rights associated with this. Indeed, Robertson thinks that such liberal
economic rights ought to be more freely recognised in international convenants.
| Read:B. Robertson,
1998. The problem with economic rights. Quadrant July—August:
45—53. |
Although Robertson does not mention
Marshall by name by, this article offers a liberal response to many of the claims
and assumptions made by Marshall and others who support social and economic rights.
Drawing on an Australian debate, John
Hyde criticises what many people would think to be a basic right. In the following
reading, he argues that there is no such thing as a 'right to strike', but claims
instead that there is a 'freedom to stop working'.
| Read:J. Hyde, 1992.
There is no such thing as the right to strike. Australian 11 November:
11. |
These writers offer only a selection
of the liberal responses that are made against socio-economic rights. Such criticisms
are based upon a view of government as a necessary evil. Since governments can
threaten and override individual freedoms, they must be limited to a range of
regulatory activities. On this view, governments ought not be encouraged to pursue
policies of positive social reconstruction. For these liberals, the responsibility
for promoting individual happiness must remain primarily an individual, not a
governmental, responsibility. These arguments are part of larger debate in which
it is claimed that governments which pursue a social(ist) agenda necessarily reduce
the range of individual freedoms available.
Conclusion
This Study Week has explored arguments
over social citizenship and social democracy, primarily in an Australian context.
The goal has been to indicate key issues surrounding governmental efforts to extend
democracy beyond directly political institutions to the social and economic sphere
of life. A further aim was to demonstrate the vulnerability of social rights.
In particular, this week has shown how recent policy changes in Australia have
eroded key aspects of the wage earners' welfare state, as well as narrowing the
scope of benefits available through the social security system.
Given the financial constraints on governments
and the prevailing economic orthodoxy of market liberalism, the delivery of social
rights and social citizenship in a non-exclusionary manner has become an increasingly
difficult task. This topic also suggests that there is another dimension to the
concept of a 'democratic deficit' first raised in Study Week 1. Given the increasing
numbers of unemployed and poor, and reluctance of government to increase taxes
to pay for social security, we may note an emerging social 'democratic
deficit'. Nonetheless, it would require a great deal of political will to reinvigorate
the social democratic project.
In the next Study Week we shall explore
another set of 'social' conditions thought necessary to protect liberal democracy.
These will include, civil society, the idea of social capital, and how these may
be understood under the heading of associational democracy.
|
Review for
Week 7
Before proceeding, you ought
to review your understanding of this week's topic by:
(a) checking your responses
to the Study Exercises against those supplied in the Study
Guide, and
(b) reading again the documents
for this week and completing the related Study Questions in the
Workbook, for which there are no answers provided.
|
References
Australian Democrats. 1997.
Work for the Dole: Dissenting Report. Canberra: Parliament of Australia:
pp. 1—4.
Australian Union Benefit Society. 1834.
United to relieve, not combined to injure. In F.K. Crowley ed. A Documentary
History of Australia Volume 1. Melbourne: Nelson, pp. 463—4.
Barbalet, J.M. 1993. Citizenship, Class
Inequality and Resentment. In B.S. Turner ed. Citizenship and Social Theory.
London: Sage. pp. 36-56.
Castles, F.G. 1994 The wage earners'
welfare state revisited: Refurbishing the established model of Australian social
protection, 1983—93. Australia Journal of Social Issues 29(2): 120—45.
Castles, Francis and Deborah Mitchell.
1993. Worlds of Welfare and Families of Nations. In F. G. Castles, ed. Families
of Nations. Aldershot: Dartmouth.
Castles, Francis G. 1988. Australian
Public Policy and Economic Vulnerability. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
Castles, Francis G. 1996. 'Australian
Social Policy: Where Are We Now?'. Just Policy 6(May): 12—15.
E.S.H. 1920. First Australian baby week:
To-day and to-morrow our nation must look to the babies. In M. Lake and K. Holmes
eds Freedom Bound II. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, pp. 35—7.
Esping-Andersen, G. 1990. The Three
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity.
Fraser, Nancy and Linda Gordon. 1994.
Civil citizenship against social citizenship? On the ideology of contract-versus-charity.
In Bart van Steenbergen, ed. The Condition of Citizenship. London: Sage
Publications, pp. 90-107.
Macintyre, S. 1985. Winners and Losers:
The Pursuit of Social Justice in Australian History. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
Macpherson, C. B. 1962. The Political
Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Marshall, T. H. [1950] 1983. Citizenship
and Social Class. Reprinted in David Held et al. eds. States and Societies.
Oxford: Martin Robertson/Open University, pp. 248-60.
Office of the Status of Women. 1998.
Submission to the Regulatory Review of the Affirmative Action Act 1986. Canberra:
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, pp. 1—3.
Pixley, J. 1992. Citizen, worker or
client? State, class and welfare. In M. Muetzelfeldt ed. Society, State &
Politics in Australia. Sydney: Pluto Press, pp. 216—53.
Pixley, Jocelyn. 1993. Citizenship
and Employment: Investigating Post-Industrial Options. Cambridge: University
of Cambridge Press.
Robertson, B. 1998. The problem with
economic rights. Quadrant July—August: 45—53.
Sloan, 1997. Opportunity knockback.
Australian 25 July: 13.
Internet and On-Line
Resources
Below is a list of web-sites relevant
to this week’s course material. These sites should be of use in completing
the study and research exercises for this week.
Australian
Bureau of Statistics
This site provides access to current statistics, media releases, etc.
Australian
Council of Trade Unions
This site includes a worksite for students, information on current issues,
media releases, etc.
Australian Council of Social Services
(ACOSS)
ACOSS is the national peak council of the community welfare sector. It is
the principal voice of low income and disadvantaged people in social and economic
policy matters.
Office
of the Status of Women
This site provides links with offices at national, state and territory levels,
each of which provides information such as media releases and access to research
reports.
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