Models of Citizenship and Democracy

1.Background - Civic Republican and Liberal Traditions

One set of ideas and values defining the 'good citizen' has its origins in classical Greece in the period 500—300 BC. This is often called the civic republican tradition, which is also linked to an ideal of direct democracy in which all citizens take part in political decisions. There is a second set of ideas and values, which draws on ideas in Roman law developed in the Roman Empire from the 1st century AD, but was fully formulated in the 17th century in Europe. This is the liberal tradition, which is linked to the ideal of parliamentary democracy, in which citizens elect a representative to look after their interests. You should understand at the end of this week some of the key ideas of civic republicanism and of liberalism. Both civic republicanism and liberalism have influenced the development of Australian beliefs about democracy and what it has meant to be an Australian citizen. Earlier political and cultural ties to Great Britain, however, have meant, that liberalism has been more influential in shaping ideas about citizenship and political institutions. You will be able to trace the influence of both liberalism and republicanism in later weeks. This will occur, for example, in the debates about whether citizens have a duty to fight for their country in wartime (see Study Week 9).

The initial meaning we often give to republicanism is rule by the people as opposed to rule by a monarch, whether this is a king or queen. In Australia, at the moment, republicanism means primarily that the British crown should cease to be even the nominal head of state. But civic republicanism means much more than rejecting monarchy, and demands that citizens put their country above their personal interests. We will examine the historical roots of civic republicanism in the city states of classical Greece and in republican Rome from approx 400—50 BC, its revival in Renaissance Italy and its evolution in 18th century Europe. The French Revolution of 1789 proclaimed republican ideals, although the famous 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen includes rights which can also be seen as liberal. You will be asked to read the Declaration as part of your work for this week.

The liberal view of citizenship stresses individual rights within a framework of the rule of law. The best form of government in liberal eyes has therefore been one in which individual rights are safeguarded by constitutional limits on government power. One well known way of restraining government is to ensure that there is a division of power between the executive (often the Prime Minister and other minsters of the government) and the legislature, or parliament which makes the laws. We will examine the evolution of liberalism within the modern state since the 17th century in England and its major political expression in the constitution of the United States which emerged at the end of the 18th century after the war of American Independence. Some writers have identified certain republican elements in the American Revolution (see e.g. Paul Rahe, 1992. Republicanism Ancient and Modern). But the dominant influence and lasting legacy is that of liberalism.

Throughout the West, full citizenship, which meant not only civil rights under the law but the right to vote in elections and stand for parliament, was originally limited to a privileged minority of the population: adult (white) males who were owners of property. Demand for the vote has been an important symbol of equal status for working men, and for women, and provided a means for asserting their interests. But extending citizenship to new groups has also been associated with claims for new kinds of rights, such as social and economic rights to create greater equality for the poor. One of the best known discussions of citizenship by T.H. Marshall (1950) defines it in terms of three distinct kinds of rights: civic rights giving individuals equal protection of their freedoms (e.g. of speech and association) under the law; political rights to vote and to be elected to office; and socio-economic rights, for example, for all to enjoy a good education and have access to welfare benefits. This week, however, focuses primarily upon the history and rationale for the first two kinds of citizens' rights. Socio-economic rights and criticisms of them will be considered in Study Week 7.

In order to understand better the two models of republican and liberal citizenship it is helpful to know more about the political contexts within which both have been developed: participatory democracy and representative democracy. We will therefore first examine these two opposing forms of democracy, before comparing historical models of republican and liberal citizenship. We will also note feminist criticisms of both. Finally, we will consider briefly the arguments for reviving civic republicanism today, arguments which in Australia have recently been linked to proposals for an Australian Republic.

2.Direct and Participatory Democracy

In the West, democracy has its origins in the classical Greek city states. The best known example is Athens in the period 461—322 BC. Democracy meant that all adult males born to Athenian parents had a right to take part in the public assembly, where policy was voted upon. In addition they were eligible to serve for a year on the key administrative bodies of Athens. Citizens were also called on to participate in jury service. Anthony Arblaster has provided a clear account of the 'invention' of democracy in Athens.

For a positive case for Athenian democracy the most famous text is Pericles' oration delivered at the funeral of soldiers who fell in the war with Sparta.

There are two wider questions of interest, which are not as easily answered as those just listed above, and which concern the relevance and practicality of direct democracy in modern societies.

• What sorts of conditions made this radical form of direct democracy possible in Greece (especially Athens)?
• How relevant today is the model of direct democracy in a small city state within a very different social context?

In the final pages of Arblaster you will find some observations on these questions.

If you want to think more about how different forms of direct democracy could be recreated in the world today, see John Burnheim (1985) Is Democracy Possible? A few of these issues are raised further by Brian Martin (1990) in Study Week 6.

The Greeks understood by democracy the direct participation by all citizens in making public policy. This was what was meant by democracy up to the 18th century. It is the model which influenced Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his Social Contract in which he envisages all citizens making laws for the collective good (though he does not envisage a democratic executive). The civic republican ideal of democracy has never been fully adapted to the realities of the nation state. Where the ideal has been maintained it has sometimes meant promoting participatory (or 'direct') democracy at the local level - as in the cantons (local government units) of Switzerland. Another approach is to enable citizens to initiate and vote in popular referenda in which a particular policy question is decided by the people's vote. There are quite frequent referenda in Switzerland on a wide range of issues including defence policy. Civic republicanism also rejects the idea that individual voters should leave it to parliamentary representatives to make key decisions for them, Rousseau commented that in the English parliamentary system the people were free once in every five years, at election time. Civic republicanism stresses instead that those elected should act as delegates of the people and should be directly answerable to them. During the French Revolution people met frequently in the communes (districts) of Paris to debate policy which they then pressed upon the National Assembly.

The model of participatory democracy has sometimes been reinterpreted within the context of the nation state to suggest that government should embody the popular will. This was the interpretation developed by radical leaders in the French Revolution, who claimed to speak for the popular will and that acting in accordance with what the people really wanted justified overriding the elected assembly and pursuit of terror to achieve revolutionary aims. (J.L. Talmon, 1952. The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy provides a well known criticism of the nature and evolution of the Rousseauist model of democracy.) Liberals have therefore viewed appeals to 'the will of the people' with alarm partly because of what happened in the French Revolution where governments claiming to act on behalf of the popular will were seen as threatening individual liberties.

3.Representative Democracy and Liberal Constitutionalism

Those arguing for representative democracy at the end of the 18th century still had the Greek idea of direct democracy (rather than its reinterpretation as the French Revolution) in mind. They rejected the Greek version not only for its impracticality in a large state, but for its perceived dangers. They argued that people may be divided into conflicting factions based on unequal distribution of property or ideological factors, and that the majority group will be tempted to attack the property and individual security of the minority. The writers who recommended the American Constitution (adopted in 1788) to the American people distinguished between 'democracy' and their proposed system of representative government. James Madison (1992 [1787]: 126), one of the three contributors to The Federalist Papers, made the distinction as follows:

A pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit no cure for the mischiefs of faction ... . A republic [Madison's term for representative democracy], by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking.

In a representative system the people hand over responsibility for governing to a small elected group or elite, and it can operate in a large territory with numerous citizens. Indeed, Madison suggests that the larger the number of citizens the more diverse their interests, and the less likely it will be that they want to oppress minorities or will be able to organise themselves to do so. Madison's views are set out in the most famous of the Federalist Papers, Paper No 10.

The framers of the American Constitution were strongly influenced by the writings of the 17th century English liberal philosopher John Locke, and the 18th century French writer Montesquieu who celebrated the balance of powers he saw in the English constitution at that time. Locke's Second Treatise of Civil Government was published just after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England, which in its Bill of Rights clarified the respective powers of King and Parliament and established a division of powers between the executive and parliament. Locke's aim was to promote a government which would respect individuals' 'natural rights' (which we would now describe as human rights) of life, liberty and property. A government which did so and governed in the people's interests could claim to rest on the people's consent; if a government acted tyrannically the people had the right to rebel. A division of powers between the legislature and executive was one method of preventing tyrannical measures. (It was Montesquieu in The Spirit of the Laws who stressed the third element, an independent judiciary.)

Locke assumed the existence of a parliament, which in his time was elected by a property-owning minority. Because taxation involved government demands on individual property, taxes must have parliamentary approval. The cry 'No taxation without representation' was taken up by the American rebels who started the American War of Independence from Britain in the late 18th century.

It was this liberal, constitutional and parliamentary framework which the designers of the American federal constitution had in mind, though they intended to remedy the evils which they thought had corrupted the British system since 1688. Nonetheless, those political leaders and writers who supported the Constitution were not democrats. Not only did they reject the Greek model, they also generally opposed all adult men having the vote (which was accepted in the French Revolution), believing that men of property would be more responsible voters. The white colonists in America at that time did not think of native Americans as being part of the same society and did not consider that African slaves on the southern plantations could claim basic civic or legal, human rights, let alone political rights.

Friedrich Hayek, one of the best known 20th century writers on liberal constitutionalism and a free market, has explained a number of these issues. This is a more difficult reading than Arblaster, but contains important arguments which should become clearer when you think about the questions and later check the answers provided. The reading also explains ideas such as 'federalism' and 'judicial review' that will be referred to in later weeks.

During the 19th and 20th centuries representative democracy has come to represent a wider range of people as the vote was extended. But the fundamental liberal principles of representative democracy have not altered. These principles are that minority and individual rights should be safeguarded, that freedom of speech, publication and association are essential to politics and that there should be constitutional restraints to prevent abuse of government power, including regular elections. It is essential that elections should be free and fairly run, so that people have a choice and that governments should be ultimately accountable to the public. But in representative democracy members of the legislature tend to see themselves as independent representatives, not delegates reflecting the will of their electors. A famous case for representation rather than delegation was made by the liberal-conservative Edmund Burke in 1774, in a speech to the electors of Bristol.

Because liberalism stresses individual rights, and because representative democracy tends to discourage direct popular influence on governmental decisions, liberals think of citizenship primarily in legal and administrative terms. That is, liberals concentrate on what legal rights citizens have and what can they expect from their government, rather than on citizenship as an active political role. This view is very different from the civic republican emphasis on political participation and duty.

4.The Origins of Citizenship

The original understanding of citizenship derives from the civic republican tradition and the political experience of the Greek city states, in particular democratic Athens. Citizenship meant participating in a direct democracy.

It is interesting to see how Aristotle in The Politics, lecturing to his students in the 4th century BC, is drawn to this participatory definition of citizenship. Aristotle (1962: 103) points out that the definition of citizenship depends on the type of constitution, but 'our definition of citizen is best applied in a democracy'.

You will be aware from Arblaster that major groups in the population of Athens were excluded automatically from citizenship: namely resident aliens not of Athenian descent, women and slaves. One reason why women were excluded was that they were deemed unable to carry out one of the major duties of citizenship, to fight for their city.

The civic republican model of citizenship has also drawn on Republican Rome in the period after 510 BC when Rome expelled its king, and in particular, after the people had gained significant political power in a series of constitutional changes, from about 400 BC. Nonetheless, Rome was never a direct democracy. Until the end of the republican period in 55 BC the aristocracy (or 'patricians') represented in the Senate had special political powers, although the highest political offices gradually became open to the common people. The people (or 'plebeians') had their own political assemblies and elected officials ('tribunes') to protect their customary liberty, and they enjoyed the political rights of citizenship. Women and slaves were excluded from citizenship, as in Greece, but the Romans were willing to extend the status of Roman citizenship to foreigners. The willingness to fight for Rome, and the qualities of the good soldier, were central to the ideal of Roman citizenship.

It is the Roman rather than the Athenian model which influenced the later republican tradition. When in Renaissance Italy Machiavelli in The Discourses contrasted rule by an individual prince with republican rule, he drew on the lessons from Rome. Machiavelli lamented the decline of republics in the Italian city states and contrasted the attitudes of the Italian people unfavourably with the civic virtue of the Romans. Rousseau, in his 1750 'Discourse on the Arts and Sciences', condemned French intellectuals and Paris society for frivolity and lack of citizenship, and looked back to the Roman Republic, with its sense of public duty, the courage of its citizen-soldiers and their patriotism.

In the French Revolution political leaders consciously drew on the ideas and even the dress of the Roman Republic, although the poor aspired to a more radical social and political equality than existed in Rome. The revolution symbolised the overthrow of the monarchy and aristocratic society by making 'citoyen' (citizen) a form of normal address. The French Revolution also made military service a central duty of citizenship, as illustrated by the revolutionary national anthem the Marseillaise. This association between citizenship and military service lasted in France until the 1990s. Working men claimed the rights of full citizenship as members of the French nation and the Revolution symbolised a new democratic spirit in Europe.

Civic republicans see a degree of economic equality (or at least the absence of glaring inequalities of wealth and poverty) as an important condition for genuine equality of citizenship and for enabling citizens to focus on the public good rather than class interests. Rousseau placed particular importance on this requirement. He had in mind a society of peasants and artisans as an ideal context. The republican ideal is harder to realise in a competitive market economy or in industrialised society.

Advocates of republicanism have also generally associated citizenship with ownership of property. There are several reasons for this linkage. In earlier times, property made it possible to acquire a broad education and to have the leisure to study and take part in politics. Democratic Athens rejected property qualifications for citizenship, but in the views of many critics it was the role of the uneducated poor with no time to take part in politics unless they were paid to do so which undermined Athenian democracy. Republicans like Roussueau also believed that property ownership provides the individual with economic resources for individual independence. Those who depend upon the will of others for their livelihood are not their own masters and cannot in this view be truly self governing and equal citizens. But in the French Revolution those without property did claim the right to be full citizens. See the range of rights claimed in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789) which was the preamble to the draft constitution of France.

These universal rights were thought to be held only by men. The civic republican tradition up to the end of eighteenth century deliberately excluded women. Republicans saw citizens as men with specifically masculine virtues. Women's role was to stay at home and be good wives and mothers. Rousseau in particular feared feminine influence in social and political life would destroy manly republican codes of behaviour. Women were, however, prominent in the popular agitation which marked stages of the Revolution, and women at first had their own political clubs until the radicals (who distrusted feminist ideas) banned them in 1793. Although a few prominent men did support women's rights, there was no debate in the Constitutional Assembly about women being left out of the new French Constitution (Kingdom 1990). Women at that time lacked economic independence, and were legally and personally dependent upon their husbands. An early feminist claim to equal citizenship was staked by Olympe de Gouges in her 1791 Declaration of the Rights of Woman and Citizen which adopted the same format as the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen but elaborated on special rights required by women.

To sum up: civic republicans had an ideal of citizenship in which the character of individual citizens was very important. A good citizen was active in politics, fought bravely for his country and cared for the public good more than his private interests.

This ideal contrasted with the liberal view, to be explored below, that citizenship was primarily a legal and administrative status. Early liberals did also restrict citizenship to men of property, but the reasons for excluding the poor and women were somewhat different.

5.The Liberal Concept of Citizenship

The rise of liberalism can be dated from the 17th century, but it has been be argued that elements in the liberal concept of citizenship date from the theory of law developed in the Roman empire from the 1st century AD. Whereas Aristotle saw the citizen as a political being, who took turns in ruling and being ruled, under Roman law the citizen was a legal being with rights and obligations under the law. This distinction is developed by J.G.A. Pocock (1992) in his article 'The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times'.

Roman lawyers developing legal codes for the empire needed to find some general principles by which to unite diverse peoples. The Roman jurists inherited from the Stoics (a philosophy influential in Greece after the decline of the Greek city state and later in Rome) the concept of 'natural law'. Natural law referred to a set of moral principles which could be understood by all human beings and applies to all human beings equally. (You will read more about the Stoics and natural law in Study Week 13.) This idea of natural law was handed down through Roman law and through Christian philosophy and was developed by liberal theorists like Locke. The early liberals embraced the idea that human beings were equal and could understand the principles of natural law through the light of inborn reason, but extended the idea of natural law to embrace a new but logically related idea: natural rights.

A legal concept of citizenship also requires, however, a much more precise legal system upheld by an ultimate political authority. The Roman concept of citizenship under law depended on the framework of imperial rule. Liberals in the early modern period found this legal framework and ultimate authority within the nation state.

The liberal model of citizenship emphasises, as we have seen, enjoyment of rights regarded as crucial for individual autonomy. These rights were originally seen primarily as civic rights, with increasing emphasis on political rights. Liberals recognise that citizens have certain obligations, such as obedience to the law and payment of taxes, which are essential to maintain the state. But they wanted to ensure that the heavier burdens like taxation should be based on consent. Whilst laws are necessary to maintain public order, liberals in the 18th and 19th centuries tended to argue for minimising the scope of law and government, and for maximising the sphere of individual liberty, with a particular emphasis upon economic liberty.

The right to own and control property was seen as a basic natural right by Locke and was and has remained central to the liberal tradition. Liberals have often seen respect for property rights as the touchstone for a general respect for individual life and liberty. There has therefore been a tension between the formal recognition of individual equality in liberal thought and the emphasis on the rights of property owners. Locke, for example, assumed that property owners should command the labour of the poor. A poor man's only property lay in 'the Labour of his body and the Work of his Hands' (Locke 1988: 287—8). Early liberals tended to assume that property owners were rational and industrious and that owning property protected by the law was the most obvious way in which individuals gave their consent to be citizens of the state. In addition individual property ownership was the basis of the market economy with which liberalism has been closely linked.

There was therefore in the 17th and 18th centuries a gap between liberals' recognition of men's right to be equal under the law (to have civil rights) and the fact that only men of property had political rights. During the 19th century working men struggled to gain the vote and political representation which could address their economic plight. Adult (white) male suffrage was generally adopted in the USA by the 1830s (subject to precise requirements which were set by individual states). But it took much longer in Britain where votes for men were extended by stages in 1832 (to all the middle class), 1867 (to most urban workers) 1884 (to most agricultural workers) and 1918 (when minimal property qualifications were abolished altogether).

During the 19th century many liberals continued to resist government action which would limit the rights of property owners, result in any redistribution of wealth or involve state intervention in the economy. But the disruptive process of industrialisation, the extremes of poverty and appalling living conditions endured by many workers, as well as the protests of the developing socialist movement, led some liberal theorists to question the earlier acceptance of the benefits of a free market and to see a case for some forms of government regulation. By the beginning of the 20th century many liberal theorists and politicians accepted that socio-economic rights were necessary to give substance to civil and political rights and create genuine equality of opportunity. But these rights required the state to adopt a wider role in providing welfare and liberals believing in a limited state and a wholly free market have continued to oppose this approach.

A well known defence of the new 'social liberalism' was provided by L.T. Hobhouse in his 1911 book Liberalism, which came out at the time a Liberal Government was introducing a different form of liberalism in Britain. Hobhouse also provides a good summary as what he sees as the core elements of liberalism in chapter 2 of Liberalism, which sets out the rights necessary to secure fundamental types of liberty. In the section on 'economic liberalism' Hobhouse recognises the historic reasons for the association between liberalism and economic freedom, but notes the new liberal emphasis on industrial regulation and welfare provision by government, and defends the rights of workers to associate in trade unions.

It took longer for women to challenge successfully the contradiction between liberal declarations of the rights of all human beings and women's total lack of both civil and political rights. Women were excluded from public life and early liberals discussed their rights and responsibilities solely in relation to marriage and the family. Men had a political role not only as individuals but as heads of families. Even liberals like Locke, who advocated that women ought be educated, also believed women were only fitted for the domestic sphere of the family. He thought that women were in general less rational than men, and therefore less suited to exercising political rights. As early as 1700 in England Mary Astell claimed the same rights for women that Locke had claimed for men (Mitchell 1984: 64).

Mary Astell was only one of a number of women who tried to assert their rights to education and a degree of independence in the 17th and 18th centuries. Women's citizenship rights were not, however, widely debated until the second half of the 19th in representative democracies such as the USA and Britain, and votes for women not achieved until the 20th century. New Zealand and Australia were in the forefront of granting votes to women. New Zealand did so in 1893 and the new Australian Federation gave the vote to all white women in 1902 (women in South Australia and Western Australia had achieved the vote before Federation). Australian feminists, however, argue that this did not mean that women gained genuine equality, or full civic, political and socio-economic rights.

Some contemporary feminist writers argue that women have still failed to achieve full citizenship because of the assumptions built into liberal thought which is based on the idea of citizenship as masculine, and which fails to recognise how women's domestic role prevents their genuine economic and political equality. Feminists argue that if women are to achieve full citizenship status, they need special rights. For example, mothers of children may need affordable child care if they are to be free to go out to work or to be active politically. One claim often made by feminists has been that women need special rights to control their own reproduction, for example through rights to contraception and abortion.

Since the 1960s, women in many western liberal democracies have managed to gain some special rights which recognise their particular needs as women, for example, the right of easy access to contraception. Feminists have also campaigned for the right to abortion on the request of the woman, but even in liberal democratic societies such as the USA and Britain this has remained contentious because of opposition on religious and sometimes medical grounds. The 1998 campaign to make abortion legal in Western Australia illustrated how strong feelings are for and against abortion. Rights at work, such as maternity leave with pay, have also been granted. But, since the 1980s, these rights have come under threat from a new type of liberalism that stressed individual responsibility and that opposed government intervention in the economy.

6.Civic Republicanism Today?

The citizens of a representative democracy tend to talk about politics in terms of their individual (liberal) rights. But if individuals stress their freedom and rights, including the right to take no interest in politics, they may neglect to do what is politically necessary to maintain an effective representative democracy. At a minimum, it is essential that most citizens vote and pay taxes. But in the USA under 50 per cent of the electorate voted in the 1996 Presidential election (turnout for all other elections is much lower) and the more prosperous (who are more inclined to vote) usually vote to lower taxes further. Moreover, representative democracies rely on people being concerned about the ills of society and having an interest in public affairs. In 1830 Alexis de Tocqueville in his classic Democracy in America argued that the large number of voluntary associations in the USA at that time created a context of social responsibility which promoted a healthy democracy.

Therefore when many people seem to retreat from all concern with their wider society and politics, some writers have reasserted the need for community (Etzioni 1993) and others have argued for a sense of public responsibility and for a revival of civic republican concept of citizenship (Barber 1984). In Australia the debate about ending links with the British monarchy has encouraged discussion of both constitutional reform and the wider political and social implications of republicanism (See the 'special issue' of Australian Journal of Political Science, 1993). Unlike many of the participants in the Australian debate over republicanism, Phillip Pettit (1993) has addressed the broader notion of republican citizenship.

Revival of interest in civic republicanism in the 20th century has generally returned to the ideal of Athens rather than Republican Rome and stressed political, rather than military, qualities and obligations. It stresses political participation and a sense of responsibility. But it does resurrect the idea that citizens have duties as well as rights, because republicanism depends upon citizens who are socially responsible and willing to put the public good above private interest. Adrian Oldfield in his book Citizenship and Community (1990) argues that civic republicanism depends primarily on moral beliefs and ways of behaving, or what de Tocqueville called 'habits of the heart'. Unless people feel and think like citizens, opportunities for participation will not create a political community (Oldfield 1990: 172). We can translate the idea of moral beliefs and manners into Australian terms. Some Australian commentators who have argued for linking a new republican constitution in Australia to an ethic of civic republicanism, see a basis in the idea of mateship and belief in 'a fair go'.

The example of Australia highlights, however, some of the major problems in trying to revive the historical civic republican ideal in contemporary societies. Earlier republicanism assumed a small, relatively homogeneous and close knit community. Most societies today are large, multicultural and ideologically diverse. Are there ways of creating citizen responsibility and some sense of a public good without requiring consensus on all values or identical customs and beliefs? One way to try to achieve this goal is through civic education by parents and schools. Another way is through giving all students some training in service to the wider community or society. Instead of military service for one or two years, young men and women could be required to gain skills and take part in environmental conservation, educational and social service programs, or in responding to natural disasters (Oldfield 1990: 166—7).

Oldfield notes that the civic republican tradition tended to assume that citizens enjoyed approximate equality of wealth. He comments very briefly on the problems of ensuring genuine political equality when massive concentrations of economic power impinge on the distribution of political power. He does not however pursue discussion of whether the civic republican ideal can make sense in a capitalist or free market economy, in particular in its late 20th century forms.

One possible compromise between civic republicanism and liberalism is provided by the concepts of civil society and associational democracy, which recognise both the diversity of society today and the arguments for strengthening civic responsibility and promoting some sense of community. You will be studying these ideas in a specifically Australian context in Study Week 8. But before examining different approaches to democracy in depth you will, in the next two weeks, gain a greater understanding of the history of citizenship and democracy in Australia.

References

 Arblaster, A. 1987. Democracy. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

Aristotle. 1962. The Politics. Ed. J.A. Sinclair. Harmondsworth: Penguin

Australia's Republican Question. 1993. Australian Journal of Political Science 28. Special Issue.

Barber, B. 1984. Strong Democracy. Berkely, CA: University of California Press.

Burke, Edmund. 1774. Speech to the electors of Bristol. In D. Ravitch and A. Thernstrom eds. 1992. The Democracy Reader. New York: Harper Collins, pp. 50—51.

Burnheim, J. 1985. Is Democracy Possible? The Alternative to Electoral Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Crick, B. ed. 1974. Machiavelli: The Discourses. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

de Gouges, Olympe. 1791. Declaration of the Rights of Woman and Citizen.

Etzioni, A. 1993. The Spirit of Community. New York: Simon and Schuster

Hamilton, A., Madison, J. and Jay, J. [1787—8] 1961. The Federalist Papers. Ed. C. Rossiter. New York: New American Library.

Hayek, F.A. 1960. The Constitution of Liberty. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Hobhouse, L.T. [1911] 1964. Liberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 2, 'The Elements of Liberalism', pp. 16—29.

Kingdom, E. 1990. Gendering Rights. In A-J Arnaud and E. Kingdom, eds. Women's Rights and the Rights of Man. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press.

Locke, J. [1698] 1988. Two Treatises of Government Edited P. Laslett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Madison, James. 1787. On factions. Federalist Papers. Paper No 10. In D. Ravitch and A. Thernstrom eds. 1992. The Democracy Reader. New York: Harper Collins, pp. 124—7.

Marshall, T.H. 1950. Citizenship and Social Class. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Mitchell, J. 1984. Women: The Longest Revolution. London: Virago.

Montesquieu, Baron de. [1748] 1949. The Spirit of the Laws. New York: Hafner Press.

Oldfield, A. 1990. Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern World. London: Routledge.

Pateman, C. 1992. Citizen male. Australian Left Review 137: 30—3.

Pettit, P. 1993. The ideal of the republic. Eureka Street 3(7): 15—17.

Pocock, J.G.A. 1992. The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times. Queens Quarterly 99: 33—55.

Rahe, P. 1992. Republicanism Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

Rousseau, J-J. 1973. The Social Contract and the Discourses. Ed. G.D.H. Cole. London: Dent.

Talmon, J.L. 1952. The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy. London: Secker and Warburg.

Thucydides, 1954. The Peloponnesian War. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Tocqueville, A. de. [1835 and 1840] 1966. Democracy in America. Ed. J..P. Mayer and M. Lerner. New York: Harper and Row.

Internet and On-Line Resources

Below is a list of web-sites relevant to this week’s course material. These sites should be of use in completing the study and research exercises for this week.

Website devoted to the Federalist Papers - includes texts and discussion

Extensive source lists for French and American Revolution

Links to general archives of many philosophy and politics texts: